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ABSTRACT 
To date, corporate governance research agendas have tended to concentrate on 
one particular role that a board performs.  For instance, agency theory concentrates on 
the monitoring role, resource dependence theory concentrates on the board providing 
access to resources and stewardship theory concentrates on the board’s advice-giving 
or strategic role.  While these approaches provide practitioners with useful guidelines 
regarding issues such as board independence, we contend that practitioners need to 
take care not to act on the recommendations from a single theory in isolation from the 
others. To address this concern, we provide a model of board effectiveness that uses 
the construct of board intellectual capital to integrate the predominant theories of 
corporate governance and illustrate how the board can drive corporate performance.  
We further contend that boards that wish to improve their performance need to review 
their intellectual capital.  We conclude by linking the model to a practitioner-focused 
framework that identifies four key areas on which a board must concentrate to 
develop its intellectual capital. 
 
KEYWORDS:  Boards of directors; Corporate governance; Intellectual capital; 
Board roles; Board effectiveness 
 3
BREAKTHROUGH BOARD PERFORMANCE: HOW TO HARNESS YOUR 
BOARD’S INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL 
The role of the board and its impact on corporate performance is a topic of 
increasing interest to the general community (Nussbaum, 2002).  Recent high profile 
corporate collapses throughout the world have only intensified media (Lavelle, 2002; 
Economist, 2002) and institutional investor scrutiny (USA Today, 2002a; 2002b).  As 
Tricker (2000: 5-6) contends, it appears that, “… as the nineteenth century had seen 
the era of the entrepreneur and the twentieth century the era of management, in the 
twenty-first century the focus has swung to the governance of companies…” 
Despite this increased interest, our understanding of how boards impact on 
corporate performance is relatively undeveloped.  In fact, practical corporate 
governance is largely reliant on normative guidelines that do not reflect empirical 
evidence.  For instance, while the majority of corporate governance reports (e.g., 
Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992) call for board 
independence, the academic community has failed to identify a consistent, significant 
relationship between board independence and firm performance (e.g., Dalton, Daily, 
Ellstrand and Johnson, 1998; Dalton, Daily, Johnson and Ellstrand, 1999; Rhoades, 
Rechner and Sundaramurthy, 2000).  Therefore, if we are to understand how the board 
influences corporate performance, we must establish a new research direction 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2000) and begin to understand the process(es) involved 
(Forbes and Milliken, 1999) 
Recent corporate governance research has begun to examine these questions of 
board process, particularly indirect processes that may link boards to corporate 
performance.  For instance, it is suggested that the likelihood of forming an alliance 
between two firms is reduced by the independence of the boards involved and 
increased by CEO-board cooperation in strategic decision-making (Gulati and 
Westphal, 1999).  Similarly, Golden and Zajac (2001) report that, in the governance 
of hospitals, board processes and demography significantly affect strategic change. 
Our objectives in this paper are twofold; first, we seek to build upon this 
process-orientated research agenda by developing a model that links board attributes 
to corporate performance via the roles that a board performs.  Second, we aim to 
outline the practical implications of this model for those boards interested in 
improving their impact on corporate performance.  The aim being to provide 
practitioner-focused guidelines for boards that are based on a number of emerging 
academic constructs.   
We commence by identifying and classifying the skills and attributes that 
characterise effective directors and by discussing the tasks or roles that a board must 
perform if it is to influence firm performance.  We contend that the board influences 
corporate performance when it carries out not one role, but a series of roles required 
of it.  Further, we argue that this role set will be contingent on a number of internal 
and external factors.  The second component of the paper links this model to a 
practitioner-focused framework. The components of the framework are defining board 
roles, improving board process, key board functions and continuing improvement.  
We conclude by highlighting how boards that address these components can 
anticipate performance improvements through content development and process 
gains. 
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BOARD EFFECTIVENESS 
Most governance recommendations focus on a single board activity rather than 
an integrated set of board roles.  For instance, high profile corporate collapses around 
the globe have heightened calls for active boards that rigorously monitor the 
corporations that they govern (Guthrie and Turnbull, 2002; Economist, 2002; New 
York Times, 2002; USA Today, 2002a; 2002b).   
In general, these calls have largely concentrated on increasing board 
independence, despite overwhelming evidence that board independence has no 
significant impact on corporate performance (Bhagat and Black, 2002; Dalton et al., 
1998; Dalton et al., 1999; Rhoades et al., 2000).  Similarly, few would argue that a 
company of independent dolts would add more value to a company than a group of 
less independent but experienced, knowledgeable and connected directors.   
This is the case for two reasons.  First, the ability to adequately monitor a 
large and complex organisation takes knowledge, skills and experience that are quite 
separate from a director’s independence.  Second, a director can contribute to 
corporate performance in several ways, for instance by providing access to resources 
(Pfeffer, 1972; 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), advice and counsel (Baysinger and 
Butler, 1985; Kesner and Johnson, 1990; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Mace, 1971; 
Westphal, 1999; Whisler, 1984) or through assisting in the development of corporate 
strategy (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999).  Thus, to better 
understand how a board contributes to firm performance, we need to understand the 
various roles required of it. 
BOARD ROLES 
Board effectiveness occurs via the execution of a role set that is 
conceptualised by different researchers in different ways (Hung, 1998; Johnson, Daily 
and Ellstrand, 1996; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992).  What is clear is that the roles of the 
board have evolved over time.  Historically, boards were seen to play a largely 
ceremonial role best exemplified by their description as “ornaments on the corporate 
Christmas tree” (Mace, 1971: 90).  Defining a clear role set is difficult as different 
disciplines concentrate on different areas of interest.  For example, Pettigrew (1992) 
identified six themes of academic research on the role of managerial elites (such as 
chairpersons, presidents, CEOs, and directors).  These include the study of 
interlocking directorates and the study of institutional and societal power, the study of 
boards and directors, the composition and correlates of top management teams, 
studies of strategic leadership, decision-making and change, CEO compensation and 
CEO selection and succession.  In contrast, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) viewed the 
board as a key link to the external environment and identified three key roles, as (1) 
Serving as a co-optive mechanism to access resources vital to the organisation; (2) 
Serving as boundary spanners; and (3) Enhancing organisational legitimacy.  Hung 
(1998), on the other hand, developed a typology of six roles and investigated their 
theoretical underpinnings.  These were (1) linking the organisation to the external 
environment; (2) coordinating the interests of shareholders, stakeholders and public; 
(3) controlling the behaviour of management to ensure organisation achieves it 
objectives; (4) strategy formulation; (5) maintenance of the status quo of the 
organisation; and (6) supporting management. 
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The lack of a clearly agreed role set is also reflected in the business press and 
prestigious reports into improving governance.  Cases such as Enron in the US and 
HIH in Australia have led to conclusions that the board is either directly responsible 
for corporate failure or did not take adequate precautions to avert the disaster 
(Brammall, 2001; Byrne, 2002; Zandstra, 2002).  Whether these conclusions about 
board accountability are correct or not, the key outcome of such events is to 
concentrate the corporate governance debate on the monitoring role of the board and 
the importance of independent directors as a mechanism to reduce agency costs and 
avert corporate collapse.  International normative guidelines also reflect this 
concentration on the monitoring role of the board.  As Table 1 illustrates, these 
sources provide structural guidelines for best practice, which generally provide 
recommendations to ensure board independence. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
There are, however, three board roles that receive broad support (Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989).  The first is the role of the board in controlling and monitoring 
management, a role made necessary by the separation of ownership from control 
(Berle and Means, 1932).  This role of the board has tended to dominate the literature, 
driven largely by growing legislated duties (OECD, 1999), fallout from corporate 
scandals in the 1970s and 1980s (Burrough and Helyar, 1990), and the rise of agency 
theory (Eisenhardt, 1989).  The second widely accepted role is that of advising the 
CEO (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989), and the third is the resource dependence 
perspective, which envisages a role for directors in providing access to resources, 
including information (Pfeffer, 1972; 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Zald, 1969). 
Our approach adapts this three-role set of Johnson et al. (1996) and Zahra and 
Pearce (1989).  In addition to the monitoring, advising, and accessing resources 
(termed strategy in Zahra and Pearce, 1989) roles these authors outline, we have 
added a separate strategising role of the board.  This role is normally subsumed under 
the “advising” role.  The strategising role is included for three reasons: the increasing 
performance pressures being applied by institutional investors (Black, 1992), board 
perception of the importance of the strategising role (Tricker, 1984), and recent legal 
precedent that places corporate goal setting and strategic direction squarely within the 
board’s charter (Baxt, 2002; Glaberson and Powell, 1985; Kesner and Johnson, 1990).  
As a result, we contend that: 
P1a: Board effectiveness depends on the execution of a set of four 
board roles, namely monitoring and controlling, strategising, 
providing advice and counsel and providing access to resources; 
and that 
P1b: Firm performance will be positively impacted by board 
effectiveness. 
CONTINGENCY AND BOARD ROLES 
While all boards are required to undertake activities within the spectrum of 
this role set, we contend that each organisation will need a different emphasis among 
these roles.  Thus, this model emphasises the need to “explicitly incorporate a 
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contingency perspective” (Heracleous, 2001: 170; Donaldson and Davis, 1994; 
Johnson, et al., 1996).  Since a particular board composition or behaviour that is 
advantageous for one corporation may prove “inappropriate or even detrimental in 
another” (Heracleous, 2001: 170) the model accounts for these differences and 
enables researchers to identify necessary control variables and gaps in our 
understanding of how the board can impact on firm performance.   
General management studies have identified that organisations need to tailor 
their resources, processes and structures to match their environment and strategy (see 
Donaldson, 1995). For example, a study of boards involved in an IPO points to the 
need to link with an investment bank in that context (Higgins and Gulati, 2000).  
Similarly, Pearce and Zahra (1991) successfully employed a contingency framework 
when they linked “participative” boards with high corporate performance and Pfeffer 
(1972) found that fitting a board design to contingency factors of debt, company size 
and regulation created optimal board performance (Donaldson and Davis, 1994). 
The particular contingencies that will impact on board roles – corporate 
performance nexus would include organisational size (Daily and Dalton, 1992; 
Dalton, et al., 1999), diversity (Siciliano, 1996), management experience (Coulson-
Thomas, 1993), industry turbulence, industry lifecycle, and firm life cycle (Johnson, 
1997).  It is these contingencies that moderate the relationship between board 
effectiveness and firm performance.  Thus we propose that: 
P2: External and internal contingencies moderate the relationship 
between board role execution and board effectiveness. 
THE INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL OF THE BOARD 
Thus far we have identified how the roles required of a board will determine 
its effectiveness and impact on corporate performance.  We turn now to examine the 
attributes of a board that will enable it to carry out the required role set.  In particular, 
we utilise the concept of intellectual capital, an area of emerging interest for research 
scholars (e.g., Bassi and Van Buren, 1999; Bontis, 1999; Brooking, 1997; Keenan and 
Aggestam, 2001; Petrash, 1996; Roos, Roos, Dragonetti, and Edvinsson, 1997; Saint-
Onge, 1996; Stewart, 1997; Sveiby, 1997).  In developing an intellectual capital 
model of the board, we adapt Stewart’s (1997) terminology to conceptualise it at a 
board level as:   
The intellectual resources such as knowledge, information, experience, 
relationships, routines, and procedures that a board can employ to 
create value. 
We believe that all boards have a capacity to vary each of these group 
attributes to create value for the firms they govern.  This is evidenced by scholarship 
that has pointed to the potential influence of board experience and knowledge (e.g., 
Castanias and Helfat, 2001), board routines and procedures (e.g., Donaldson and 
Davis, 1994), board relationships (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Westphal, 1999) and 
the board’s access to knowledge (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Intellectual capital provides a three-construct taxonomy to classify these 
individual board attributes (e.g., see Bontis, 1999; Burton-Jones, 1999; Roos, et al., 
1997).  These three constructs are developed to capture the intelligence found in 
human beings (human capital), group/organisational routines (structural capital) and 
relationships (or social capital) (Bontis, 1999).  We contend that all boards share these 
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three attributes.  The broad conceptualisation afforded by intellectual capital is 
particularly appealing because it facilitates a multidimensional perspective for 
understanding how the board may impact on corporate performance.  As outlined 
earlier, recent empirical studies have concentrated on the relationship between board 
attributes and the influence of the board on corporate behaviours such as alliance 
formation (Gulati and Westphal, 1999) or ability to impact strategic change (Golden 
and Zajac, 2001) rather than direct board attribute – corporate performance 
relationships.  Evidence and theory development suggests that a single board attribute 
or demographic may impact on more than one process by which a board can influence 
corporate performance (e.g., Westphal, 1999; Heracleous, 2001; Forbes and Milliken, 
1999).  Significantly, it is even suggested that the same demographics may benefit 
one process and inhibit another (Westphal, 1999).  Thus rather than being required to 
choose between board functions (for example, the monitoring role required by agency 
theory or the access to resources hypothesised by resource dependence theory), this 
approach frees the researcher to study how board attributes may in fact impact on 
several different functions enacted by the board.  This makes intellectual capital a 
sound alternative for developing an integrative model of corporate governance.  In the 
sections that follow, we elaborate each of these sub-domains of intellectual capital. 
HUMAN CAPITAL:  THE KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS AND EXPERIENCE PRESENT 
ON THE BOARD 
Human capital has, along with physical capital, been seen as one of the “key 
resources for the firm that facilitate productive and economic activity” (Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal, 1998: 245).  In the management context, human capital has been variously 
described as the “innate and learned abilities, expertise, and knowledge” of actors 
(Castanias and Helfat, 2001: 662) and the “tacit knowledge embedded in the minds of 
managers” (Bontis, 1999: 443).  Human capital is often viewed as the basis for all 
intellectual capital, as the raw intelligence of members is exogenous to the board 
(Bassi and Van Buren, 1999) and so forms the basis of the capacity for directors to 
act. 
Most boards face a myriad of tasks and a common concern echoed in the 
normative literature relates to a board’s composition reflecting its human capital 
needs (Charan, 1998; Conger, Lawler and Finegold, 2001; Kiel and Nicholson, 2002).  
While the presence of human capital is not equivalent to the effective use of that 
capital, the ability of the board to provide advice to management and, arguably, to 
monitor management “depends on their expertise and ability to fully comprehend a 
firm’s business situation” (Castanias and Helfat, 2001: 673).  Thus, we would 
anticipate that a board’s composition would determine its human capital and lead to 
different board actions/activities and outcomes. 
Although human capital appears to be an important resource of the board, 
there is relatively little direct empirical investigation of the effect of board human 
capital on firm performance.  Instead, studies have tended to apply human capital 
theory (Becker, 1964) to the CEO (Castanias and Helfat, 1991; 2001; Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1996) and top management teams (Harvey, 2000; Hitt, Hoskisson, 
Harrison and Summers, 1994).  While there is a significant overlap between boards 
and TMTs, we would agree that the relatively unique group attributes of a board of 
directors (e.g., see Forbes and Milliken (1999) for an overview of these traits) 
together with the unique nature of board tasks warrants focused treatment separate 
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from that of management.  This view is reinforced by one of the few studies into 
board “knowledge structures” where, applying a socio-cognitive approach, Carpenter 
and Westphal (2001) found that differences in prior board experiences were correlated 
with differences in director involvement in strategy decision-making.   
Human capital also has the potential advantage of differentiating a firm.  Since 
skill differentials between directors “both in the types of skills that individuals 
possess, and the degree of skilfulness” (Castanias and Helfat, 1991: 160), there is a 
distinct heterogeneity in the skills set of the peak decision-making body of the 
corporation.  In his classic work on the resource-based view of the firm, Barney 
(1991) argued that imperfect mobility and heterogeneity are key sources for 
competitive advantage and rent generation.  Thus boards, through their unique 
combination of skills, are a potential source of advantage for the firms they govern. 
Prior research into the human capital of managers has focused on a nested 
series of constructs comprising generic, related-industry, industry-specific and firm-
specific skills (Castanias and Helfat, 2001).  This traditional managerial focused 
definition can be expanded to include functional knowledge and skills (including 
human resources, marketing, finance and business) and areas relevant to a firm’s 
interaction with its environment, such as law (Forbes and Milliken, 1999).  We would 
also include a level of board-specific skills that seeks to directly measure the skill set 
of the directors related to a board.  We propose that: 
P3: The human capital of the board (i.e. the board’s knowledge, 
skills and abilities) impacts the effectiveness of the board. 
SOCIAL CAPITAL:  FACILITATING INSTRUMENTAL ACTION 
In addition to the knowledge, skills and abilities of directors, our model is 
concerned with the social ties that directors bring to an organisation.  The broad 
nature of the construct has lead to statements such as that of Narayan and Pritchett 
(1999: 871) who comment: “Social capital, while not all things to all people, is many 
things to many people” and has meant that its validity has been questioned (e.g., 
Baron and Hannon, 1994; Fine, 1999). Adler and Kwon (2002) argue, however, that 
social capital is indeed a valid construct and it relates to the elements of social 
structure that form a resource for social action (Baker, 1990; Burt 1992; Coleman, 
1990).  We define social capital as follows (adapted from Gabbay and Leenders, 
1999: 3):   
The implicit and tangible set of resources available to assist a 
corporate player in goal attainment by virtue of all relevant social 
relationships available to members of the organisation. 
Over the past several years, a range of scholars including sociologists, political 
scientists and economists have begun to use the concept of social capital to investigate 
a broad array of questions (Adler and Kwon, 2002).  This is because the breadth of the 
concept applies to numerous elements of social and organisational life.  For instance, 
studies have focused on the individual (e.g., Lin and Dumin, 1986, Burt, 1997; 
Gabbay and Zuckerman, 1998; Seibert, Kraimer and Liden, 2001), groups and 
business units (e.g., Rosenthal, 1996), inter-unit resource exchange (Tsai and 
Ghoshal, 1998), the firm (e.g., Baker, 1990), as well as inter-firm learning (Kraatz, 
1998). 
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Since a necessary (but not sufficient) condition of social capital is a link 
between individuals, these empirical investigations highlight the fact that social 
capital exists at several different levels in an organisation.  Thus, because social 
structures exist within groups, between groups and between the organisation and the 
external environment, the social capital of the board will lie at three levels:  intra-
board relationships, board-management relationships (particularly between the board 
and the CEO and management) and extra-organisational relationships.   
In addition to the location of the source of social capital, the construct itself is 
multi-dimensional (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Adler and Kwon, 2002).  This is 
because social capital is dependent on the individual “tie” or connection and the 
nature of that tie (e.g., see Granovetter’s (1992) discussion of relational and structural 
embeddedness).  Thus, any valid social capital measure must look to two items.  The 
first is the network ties between actors (Scott, 1991) and configuration of these 
linkages (Krackhardt, 1992), while the second is the nature of these ties.  Nahapiet 
and Ghoshal (1998: 244) see the “key facets” of these ties as being “trust and 
trustworthiness, norms and sanctions, obligations and expectations and identity and 
identification”. 
To summarise, the social capital of the board lies in three levels; at the intra-
board level it can be characterised as a “bonding” form of social capital between 
directors, at the extra-organisational level it forms a “bridging” type of social capital 
between the board and external organisations and at the board-management level it 
has elements of both “bridging” and “bonding” social capital (Adler and Kwon, 2002: 
19).  Further, at each level of social capital, it is necessary to identify the 
multidimensional nature of the social capital, that is to say the physical tie and 
network structure and also the character of that tie. 
Since social capital enables the use of resources through a tie at three levels, 
we have three propositions:  The first deals with extra-organisational social capital 
whereby the board can co-opt external resources for use by the organisation.  This 
would directly impact the access to resources role and provide responses such as 
information for the remaining role set.  Thus we propose that: 
P4: Extra-organisational board social capital facilitates the 
execution of board roles. 
However, unlike extra organisational social capital, both intra-board and 
board-management social capital are concerned with the use of resources within the 
company.  Rather than directly affecting the execution of the role set, intra-board 
social capital will moderate the relationship between board human capital and board 
roles.  It is the nature and structure of the social ties that will impact on how well the 
board uses individual director human capital.  Thus, 
P5:  Intra-board social capital moderates the relationship between 
human capital and board roles. 
Similarly, board-management social capital relates to the use of the board’s 
human capital by the management team and we would expect that: 
P6:  Board-management social capital moderates the relationship 
between human capital and board roles. 
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BOARD STRUCTURAL CAPITAL: THE VALUE OF ROUTINES 
In addition to board attributes captured by the two constructs of human and 
social capital, we note that the board’s internal processes differ between corporations 
(Pearce and Zahra, 1991).  This is because a board’s routines, policies and procedures 
are, in effect, a set of codified knowledge that has an ability to build competitive 
advantage (Bontis, 1999).  This codified knowledge, both explicit and tacit, has been 
conceptualised as structural capital (e.g., Bontis, 1998: 65; Edvinsson and Sullivan, 
1996: 19; Saint-Onge, 1996: 20; Stewart, 1997: 74).  It is the board’s structural 
capital, its routines, processes, procedures and policies that facilitate the board’s use 
of its human and social capital. 
While the constructs of human capital and social capital are rooted in the 
attributes of the individual (Castinas and Helfat, 2001), structural capital is a function 
of the group, in this case the board.  Board structural capital refers to the corporate 
governance routines of an organisation (adapted from Bontis 1999: 447).  According 
to the Oxford Thesaurus “routine” is a synonym for “procedure, practice, pattern, 
regime ... schedule, method, system, order, ways, customs, habits”.  As Bontis (1999: 
447) notes, the “construct deals with the mechanisms and structures of the 
organization” that can “turn individual know-how into group property”.  Thus, in the 
case of a board, the term “routines” can encapsulate the shared knowledge of the 
group, both tacit and explicit (see Bontis, 1999; Edvinsson and Sullivan, 1996; Saint-
Onge, 1996; Stewart, 1997) that acts to facilitate the functioning of the board. 
Recognition of the potential importance of structural capital to board 
effectiveness has a long, if not explicit history (e.g., Vance, 1983; Mace, 1971; Lorsch 
and MacIver, 1989).  In particular, significant research effort has focused on the 
impact of committees (e.g., Klein, 1998), most notably the audit committee (Klein, 
2002), remuneration committee (Conyon and Peck, 1998) and nominating committee 
(Vafeas, 1999) with findings that there is a link between the presence of board 
committees and board effectiveness.  Additionally, several other key elements of 
board structural capital have been examined.  For instance, the board agenda has been 
shown to focus the work of the board (Inglis and Weaver, 2000) and that operating 
performance of a corporation improves following years of abnormal board activity 
(Vafeas, 1999).  Finally, the decision making style of the board has been linked to 
corporate performance (e.g., Peace and Zahra, 1991). 
The academic investigation of the structural capital of boards is supplemented 
by normative interest in the topic.  The emergence of “codes of best practice” drawn 
up by institutional investors (e.g., the California Public Employees’ Retirement 
System (CalPERS)), national regulatory authorities (e.g., Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission; Securities and Exchange Commission), stock market 
regulations (e.g., the requirement for an audit committee under New York Stock 
Exchange listing rules) and global institutional guidelines (e.g., the OECD Principles 
of Corporate Governance) highlight the importance placed on attributes of the board 
by practitioners.  Likewise, advice from governance handbooks stresses the 
importance of policies, procedures and processes (e.g., Charan, 1998; Conger, Lawler 
and Finegold, 2001; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). 
Board structural capital appears to work as an enabler of the human capital 
possessed by the board – a point we return to later.  For this reason, we note that 
researchers can operationalise the construct in two ways.  First, as a generalised 
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construct applying to all board routines, researchers could operationalise structural 
capital by asking board members to gauge, using Likert-type scales, the board’s 
assessment of its structural capital.  Such items could include statements such as the 
following:  “Board processes support the work of the board” and “Board policies 
inhibit the work of the board” (reverse coded).  Second, where a particular element of 
structural capital is theoretically important for the relationship to be studied (for 
instance, if the audit committee is seen as critical to the monitoring role of the board) 
then the researcher may instead concentrate on operationalising that aspect of 
structural capital just as human capital researchers concentrate on a specific element 
of human capital, for example, functional background (e.g., Ocasio and Kim, 1999; 
Pelled, Eisenhardt and Xin, 1999; Westphal and Milton, 2000).  Since the purpose of 
this paper is to outline an integrative model, not present a complete discourse on the 
nature and dimensions of board structural capital, we would point out that the 
inclusion of this construct highlights an important consideration for researchers in the 
field.  In particular we propose that: 
P7: Structural capital moderates the relationship between human 
capital and board role execution. 
The complete model is outlined in figure 1. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CHARTER MODEL 
Based on this model, we have developed the Corporate Governance Charter 
model (CG Charter) as both a structure and a process to guide practitioners seeking to 
build more effective boards.  In particular, it helps a board to drive business success 
by guiding a process that matches the company’s governance system to organisational 
needs. This model is elaborated in Kiel and Nicholson (2003).  The discussion here 
outlines the link between the intellectual capital theory of corporate governance and 
the Corporate Governance Charter model.  As such it elaborates the theoretical basis 
of the basis of the Corporate Governance Charter model. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The model contains four quadrants.  The first, defining board roles, seeks to 
elaborate the human capital needs of the firm by defining roles for individuals and the 
group.  This will necessarily account for firm contingencies.  Since the board and 
management will need to work together to develop these role definitions, it will also 
develop intra-board social capital and board-management social capital.  The second 
quadrant of the model, improving board process, concentrates on developing the 
board’s structural capital through examining its processes and routines.  As with the 
rest of the model, the intra-board and board-management social capital will develop 
as the leadership of the company develops shared expectations.  The third quadrant 
specifically addresses the board roles that require elaboration.  It is by performing the 
functions highlighted in this quadrant that the board can improve its effectiveness and 
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corporate performance.  These roles require an appropriate mix of human, social and 
structural capital.  Of course, developing requirements in this area will need to include 
an examination of firm contingencies.  Finally, the board needs to ensure that it will 
have the human and social capital needed into the future.  Therefore, the fourth 
quadrant focuses on keeping governance an evergreen topic for the board.  The 
remainder of the paper focuses on elaborating each of these quadrants. 
DEFINING GOVERNANCE ROLES 
The board (as a group) bears ultimate responsibility for the company that it 
governs, however it is not clear just how a board should begin to handle this 
responsibility.  To assist in this regard, the first quadrant of the CG Charter asks that 
directors consider the overall philosophy of governance that the board is to adopt and 
how governance differs from management for this individual organisation. 
The answer to this question will vary according to the particular contingencies 
facing the organisation.  Ownership structure, stage of maturity, strategies employed 
and the industry and business environment are all factors that will all affect the way 
that a board views its purpose in governance and its relationship with management.  It 
should also be noted that the board’s view of governance could also be affected by the 
individual strengths and weaknesses of existing board members (i.e. the human and 
social capital of the board). 
When the board has adopted a clear view of its responsibilities in governing 
the company, the directors can then move to discuss and agree the most effective way 
of structuring the board.  For example, consideration could be given to the size of the 
board itself - is the board too small or too large to adequately fulfil its requirements, 
given the size and complexity of the organisation?  The balance of executive and non-
executive directors and whether independent directors are necessary is another 
structural issue to consider.   Likewise, does the board have the optimal skills mix to 
deliver effective governance considering the nature of the company governed?  
Depending on the circumstances, the board may benefit from having a member with 
industry experience, legal expertise or perhaps a director representative of a key 
stakeholder.  Such considerations are often complex and require significant 
discussion, prioritisation and agreement. 
After determining the role of the board as a whole and its structure, including 
the skills and experience that should be represented on the board, it is useful for the 
group to consider individual roles in governance.  Since directors must also be 
familiar with their individual duties and responsibilities, this typically begins with a 
discussion of the formal legal role of individual directors.  At the practical level, this 
means being able to understand company statements of financial performance and 
statements of financial position, sources and methods of funding, cash flow and other 
financial data, as well as having a familiarity with company law and contract law, and 
an understanding of the nature of the business.  Generally, examining the role of a 
director also includes the formulation of a code of conduct for board members, 
including appropriate behaviours both within and outside the boardroom. 
The board may also wish to consider the roles of three key governance 
individuals, the chairman, the company secretary and the CEO.  The chairman, as lead 
director, needs to guide the board so it acts effectively and efficiently.  He/she often 
oversees the development of the board agenda, undertakes certain public relations 
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responsibilities and acts to ensure that board meetings run smoothly.  Typically, the 
chairman is the driving force behind board evaluation processes and is often the 
person to take on a key advisory role in the company, playing a key linking role 
through the development of a strong mentoring relationship with the CEO.  This role 
is critical to governance success and boards would do well to articulate what is 
expected of the chairman in this regard. 
A governance role that is changing in significant ways is that of the company 
secretary.  Although the role is less important in smaller companies, it is becoming 
more important in larger organisations where the company secretary is increasingly 
charged with ensuring good governance and compliance.  The CG Charter process is 
often a good time to delineate the responsibilities (if any) of the company secretary, 
particularly with respect to issues of meeting process, risk management and 
compliance. 
The third key role often considered in the governance process is that of the 
CEO.  A positive relationship between the board and the CEO is essential to good 
governance.  Therefore some commentators hold that the single most important role 
of the board is to appoint, monitor, evaluate, mentor and replace (when necessary) the 
CEO (e.g., Carver and Carver, 1997).  Most difficulties in the board-CEO relationship 
tend to occur through a misunderstanding of the relationship between the respective 
roles of the board and management.  This problem can usually be avoided through 
shared understanding and development of governance roles.  
IMPROVING BOARD PROCESSES 
As noted above, the structural capital of the board is rooted in its processes, 
procedures, routines and practices and facilitates the use of the board’s human and 
social capital.  The second quadrant of CG Charter model addresses the structural 
capital of the board, which moderates the relationship between its human capital and 
board role execution.  The structural capital of the board can be considered once the 
members of the board are comfortable in their roles and can turn to productivity 
issues, such as how effectively information is exchanged between members and the 
best communication strategies to ensure effective decision-making.  Thus, the CG 
Charter encourages board members to consider the effectiveness of their meeting 
procedures, agendas, board papers and minutes as well as the board calendar of events 
and ensuring efficient process for board committees.  
The board meeting is the lynchpin of a corporation’s governance processes.  
Successful meetings achieve a common goal through effective communication and 
collective action.  For meetings to be successful, it is important to recognise that each 
meeting has its own dynamic and outcomes depend on the personalities, needs and 
intentions of the people present.  Similarly, outcomes are influenced by the degree of 
complexity of the issues under consideration, and on the legal and time restraints that 
govern board process.  Bearing these considerations in mind, effective meetings 
depend on planning, orderly conduct and active participation by all board members. 
Central to the planning process for all board meetings is the meeting agenda 
and associated board papers.  A well-designed agenda aids the flow of information 
and shapes subsequent discussion by the board, while the board papers are the key 
source of information for board members. The format of individual board submissions 
tend to be fairly similar in well-governed organisations; typically each paper states its 
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purpose, provides background information on an agenda item, presents major issues 
for consideration and makes recommendations.  A full set of board papers prepared 
for directors should include an agenda, the minutes of the previous meeting, major 
correspondence, the CEO’s (or equivalent’s) report, including a report on 
risk/compliance (unless covered elsewhere), financial reports and documentation 
supporting submissions that require decisions.   
As part of any systematic review of its corporate governance processes, a 
board will need to consider its workflow during the year.  In general, the efficiency 
and effectiveness of board process will be improved by developing a structured 
annual calendar of major board events to ensure specific items are discussed at the 
appropriate time, that enough time is provided for preparatory work leading up to a 
major meeting and that routine (but less interesting) aspects of the board’s work are 
not overlooked. 
Another way of improving the efficiency of board process is through the 
creation of committees.  A committee is a group of members to whom some specific 
role has been delegated.  Committees can be used to gather, review and summarise 
information and report back to the full board for decision, or can be delegated specific 
decision-making powers.  As the workload for boards has increased, there has been a 
corresponding tendency towards the creation of a variety of committees to deal with 
specific issues.  They can also be useful tools for building individual director 
expertise in addition to alleviating the workload of the entire board.  Three of the 
more common and generally more important committees are the audit committee, the 
remuneration committee and the nomination committee.  No matter whether the 
committee’s role is to make recommendations or make decisions, it is important to 
develop ground rules to ensure that any committees are subservient to the board.   
KEY BOARD FUNCTIONS 
Perhaps the most difficult challenge for directors is to consider objectively the 
effectiveness of their boards.  By examining the critical functions of the board in the 
corporate governance system, the third quadrant of the CG Charter model guides 
directors through areas of fundamental importance to every board.  In discussing 
board roles and board effectiveness above, we defined four board roles (monitor and 
control; advice and counsel; access to resources; strategy control) that result in board 
effectiveness.  These four roles encompass the key board functions dealt with in the 
third quadrant including strategy formulation, the service/advice/contacts role, 
monitoring, compliance, risk management, CEO evaluation and delegation of 
authority. 
The first of these key board functions is strategy formulation.  The board’s 
objective in strategy formulation is to ensure that the strategy of the company will 
lead to the long-term creation of shareholder wealth or other stated major goals of the 
organisation.  However, the level of board involvement will vary from company to 
company.  For example, the board may see its role as developing the strategic 
questions for management to answer, while another approach sees the board setting 
broad objectives for management to implement. 
The next key area for the board to consider is the role directors play in 
providing advice to the CEO.  As already noted, the board-CEO relationship is central 
to corporate governance.  It provides the link between the direction of the company 
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provided by the board, and the day-to-day implementation of that direction that is the 
responsibility of the CEO.  The board should be a key source of knowledge and 
experience for the organisation it governs.  Therefore, it is important for the board to 
share its experience with management, particularly, the CEO, to serve the interests of 
the company.   
The board also has an important function in accessing resources.  All 
companies, whatever their size or the nature of their business, need access to outside 
resources if their businesses are to succeed.  These resources vary enormously from 
company to company, but fall into two main categories, information (e.g., industry or 
competitor data) and physical resources (e.g., investors to support an IPO, an 
extended line of credit, bank loans for expansion).  Developing business networks and 
working to promote the reputation of the firm are two other important ways that a 
board can add value to the company. By acting in an open, professional and ethical 
manner in their dealings with people outside of the organisation, board members also 
raise the profile of the firm and enhance its reputation. 
Monitoring is an important role of the board, and the monitoring of an 
organisation’s performance is widely recognised as necessary for ensuring business 
goals are being met.  Monitoring involves both the financial and non-financial key 
performance indicators of a company.  Coupled with this is the added pressure on 
directors to ensure that they are monitoring their organisation’s compliance with the 
many laws and regulations and risk management procedures that impact on its 
operations.  Compliance means that a company is acting legally and that company 
officers are performing their duties in the interests of the company as a whole, while 
the term risk management includes the identification of all significant risks faced by 
the company and ensuring that appropriate policies are in place to moderate the 
impact of these risks.  Thus, risk management can be regarded as the two-fold process 
of evaluating a company’s exposure to critical events, and treating, monitoring and 
communicating responses to those threats.   
The final function that a board needs to consider is its duty with respect to 
delegating authority.  Given the complexity of the business environment, it is 
impossible for the board to be the sole decision-making body in the company.  
Instead, each board needs to work on developing an appropriate method and level of 
delegation of authority.  Obviously this will again vary with the context facing the 
board but, in all circumstances, the board needs to clearly articulate and document the 
delegations it makes. 
CONTINUING IMPROVEMENT 
As well as being confident in the roles, functions and processes of the board, 
our experience is that directors are continually searching to find ways of ensuring that 
their board adds value to the organisation it governs.  Accordingly, the fourth 
quadrant of the CG Charter model deals with the processes and procedures necessary 
for ensuring continuing improvement and corporate renewal.  As such, this quadrant 
involves the human, social and structural capital of the board, in dealing with issues 
such as director protection, board evaluation, director remuneration, director 
development and director selection and induction. 
Good corporate governance requires that directors are free to pursue their 
duties without fear of litigation, since in recent years directors have come to feel 
 16
increasingly vulnerable as they undertake their duties.  A governance system that does 
not inform its members of their obligations (and then appropriately protect them from 
litigation) risks making board decision-making processes ineffective as directors 
concentrate more on personal exposure than corporate benefit.  Given the fact that 
directors are increasingly likely to face the threat of legal action, most companies put 
in place Directors and Officers Insurance as a means of protecting their board 
members.  Exposure to risk can be minimised if directors are aware of their legal 
obligations, document all board decisions thoroughly and conscientiously and consult 
with experts, in particular legal advisors, to keep informed of changes in the law. 
We contend that a key way for a board to improve is through critical 
evaluation.  While the evaluation of board performance has become a subject of 
growing interest over the past decade, many boards do not routinely undertake a 
formal evaluation process.  A Korn/Ferry (1998) survey found that while one-third of 
US companies formally evaluated the performance of the board on a regular basis, 
only 19% of the survey respondents evaluated individual directors (although 75% 
thought they should do so).   
The first stage any board evaluation process is to set meaningful goals against 
which the performance of the board is to be measured.  By doing this, the board is 
continually working to ensure its adoption of best practice.  In addition to assessing 
the board as a whole, the assessment of individual directors can add substantial value 
to the organisation.  However, assessment of directors should be viewed as a tool to 
diagnose the needs for individual director development rather than as a “report card”.   
A commitment to director development is a commitment to the continuing 
improvement of an organisation.  It is a process that adds value to the company by 
enhancing its intellectual capital and serves to build confidence with shareholders and 
other stakeholders.  Director development benefits individuals, boards and the 
companies for which they work.  The power of the board as a competitive weapon 
depends on the quality and diversity of its directors.   
Similarly, choosing the right board members is a major component of ensuring 
ongoing corporate renewal.  To ensure best practice in corporate governance, it is 
recommended that formal policies on director selection emphasise the distinction 
between governance and management, state explicitly what is required of an effective 
director (including skills and attributes), and establish a process that ensures that these 
qualities form the basis of the selection process.   
When a director is appointed, it is vital that the appointee be appropriately 
briefed about his or her new role.  Survey evidence indicates that nine out of every ten 
directors have no preparation at all for their role on the board, and another two thirds 
of directors indicate that they received no formal assistance after their appointment 
(Coulson-Thomas, 1993).  Therefore, it is important for a board to establish a system 
of induction that familiarises the new director with both the duties of the position and 
the operations of the firm, as well as encouraging director development and 
introducing the concept of performance evaluation as an essential aspect of board 
process. 
A further area for the board to consider is director remuneration.  This issue 
has been the topic of much public debate, especially where public companies have 
allowed directors’ salaries to increase while firm performance stands still or even 
declines.  While the issue is a complex and sensitive one, director remuneration offers 
an important leverage factor that can stimulate good governance within the board.  
There is no one best remuneration system for directors so companies should tailor 
their own remuneration packages to suit their specific requirements.   
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CONCLUSION 
Since the board is the peak decision-making group in corporate life, 
understanding how they can impact on corporate performance is one of the most 
challenging and important tasks facing management researchers.  As Stiles and Taylor 
(2001: 7) highlighted in a recent book: 
The problem in trying to assess the contribution of boards to the 
running of organizations, and hence the expectations we realistically 
have of them, lies in the fact that basic grounded research is ‘still in its 
infancy’ (Pettigrew, 1992). There is a dearth of strong descriptive data 
on how boards of directors perceive their role and in what respects 
they can influence the performance of the firm.   
By understanding how a board’s skills, resources and attributes allow it to 
discharge its roles, we believe that management researchers can further understand the 
hitherto elusive links between boards of directors and corporate performance.  The 
intellectual capital taxonomy and contingency basis of our model provides a 
framework for researchers seeking to understand these elusive tasks. 
Future research based on the intellectual capital model we have developed 
here has the potential to inform high profile governance debates, such as the role of, 
and need for, independent directors.  This direction will complement recent advances 
in process-orientated research into corporate governance and allow for an elaboration 
of recent research into organisational demography manifested in various 
organisational groups. 
From a practitioner’s perspective, clarifying the attributes of a board that 
contribute to effective role execution has the potential to improve corporate 
performance significantly.  An intellectual capital approach may assist boards and 
their advisers in assessing their composition needs and constructing relevant process-
related interventions to improve board performance.  We have attempted in this paper 
to convert the intellectual capital model to a practitioner-focused framework that can 
assist those boards seeking to improve their performance. 
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TABLE 1:  GUIDELINES/REPORTS FOR BEST PRACTICE 
RECOMMENDATION 
COUNTRY GUIDELINE/ REPORT Size of board CEO duality Outside directors 
Independent 
directors 
UK Higgs Report (Higgs, 2003) 
Should be of a 
size that the 
balance of skills 
and experience 
is appropriate 
for the 
requirement of 
the business 
The two roles 
should be 
separate 
N/A At least half 
US 
NACD Blue 
Ribbon 
Commission 
(NACD, 2000) 
Board to 
determine 
The two roles 
should be 
separate 
N/A Substantial majority 
Canada 
Toronto Stock 
Exchange 
Committee 
Report (1994) 
10-16, board to 
determine 
The two roles 
should be 
separate 
N/A Majority must be unrelated 
Australia Bosch Report (Bosch, 1995) 
Nomination 
committee to 
devise criteria 
The two roles 
should be 
separate.  
If combined, an 
independent 
non-executive 
director as 
deputy 
chairman is 
recommended 
Majority One third 
International 
OECD Principles 
of Corporate 
Governance 
(OECD, 1999) 
N/A N/A Sufficient number N/A 
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FIGURE 1:  INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL MODEL OF THE BOARD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HUMAN 
• Knowledge
• Skills
Abilities
Practices• Procedures
• Routines• Process
Extra -
Org
-
Mgmt
Intra-
Board
•
BOARD ROLES
•
CONTINGENCY
Monitor 
& 
Control
Access
to
Resources
Advice
&
Counsel
BOARD 
EFFECTIVENESS 
P3
P5 P6 P4
P7
P1a
P2
P1b
SOCIAL CAPITAL
Board
STRUCTURAL CAPITAL
FIRM
PERFORMANCE
CAPITAL
Strategising
INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL
 27
FIGURE 2: THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CHARTER MODEL 
 
Source: Kiel and Nicholson: 2003 
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